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Board diversity reforms: Do they matter for EU bank 
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We examine the impact of governance reforms related to board diversity on the performance of 
EU banks. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we document that reforms increase bank 
stock returns and their volatility within the first three years after their enactment. The type of 
reform matters, with quotas increasing return volatility more compared to affirmative actions. 
The effectiveness of reforms depends on a country's institutional environment. The impact on 
volatility is lower in countries more open to diversity, with common law system and with higher 
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“Members of boards of directors did not come from sufficiently diverse backgrounds.”  
 (European Commission, 2010, p. 6) 
 
1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, policy makers and bank regulators started raising 
questions about the effectiveness of boards of financial institutions, as it became apparent that this key 
decision-making body did not fulfil its major role to exert monitoring over senior management and failed 
to identify, understand, and challenge risk-taking practices. Several shortcomings were identified in post-
crisis analyses, the most common of which concerned the composition of the board of directors. The 
European Commission (2010) noted “a lack of diversity and balance in terms of gender, social, cultural 
and educational background” and called for strong and legally binding action from Member States and 
EU institutions to ensure diversity in boardrooms. Thus, a series of initiatives ensued to promote gender 
equality and diversity on the boards of publicly listed companies, which resulted in changes to national 
corporate governance codes in a number of countries. At the EU level, CRD IV (a 2013 legislative 
package covering prudential rules for banks) includes enhanced corporate governance rules, 
incorporating requirements to promote diversity in board composition.  
Did the corporate governance reforms aiming at increasing the diversity of bank boards impact 
on bank performance? This paper addresses this question by employing an identification strategy that 
allows us to study the impact of board reforms using between country variation in the timing and the type 
of reforms pursued, reform approach, as well as the type of diversity supported and the country 
institutional background. 
The board of directors is primarily responsible for monitoring managerial performance and 
therefore ensuring adequate returns for shareholders. To achieve these objectives, the board also has the 
authority to replace the firm’s management when underperforming. The prevailing consensus is that more 
diverse boards would positively affect the corporate governance of companies, leading to better 
performance. Diversity has a number of potential benefits: board members can be selected from a wider 
pool of talent, which can offer a broader range of perspectives, access different resources and wider 
connections. Diversity is often seen as key to creativity and innovation (Hillman, 2014). On the other 
hand, diversity can lead to conflict, slow down decision-making, and lead to conflict of interest as 
different board members may be pursuing different agendas (Ferreira, 2011). Veltrop et al. (2015) argue 
that diversity can have a detrimental effect on board effectiveness if it fosters social categorisation, 
resulting in groups or factions opposed to each other. In this context, gender diversity has received a great 
deal of interest, as a gender gap persists in the financial industry and there is growing evidence of a glass 
ceiling (IMF, 2018). However, whether the gender diversity of the board matters for firm performance is 
more controversial. Pletzer et al. (2015) present a systematic review of the literature and conclude that the 
relationship is consistently small and non-significant. In other words, female representation on corporate 
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boards is not associated, positively or negatively, with firm performance. This result reinforces the view 
that women are neither better nor worse than men in leadership positions or at managing risks and that 
promoting less-gender biased hiring may lead to a mixed-gender board performing better because of the 
benefits of a multiplicity of views and skills rather than simply because of women’s presence (Nelson, 
2014). 
It is important to point out that, despite the policy consensus on the need for encouraging 
diversity, the approaches taken at the national level have varied widely, with some countries introducing 
mandatory quotas for gender and employee representatives, others promoting diversity more generally as 
an encouraged best practice. Recent evidence suggests that affirmative actions aimed at improving the 
participation of women and minorities in high profile roles have had little impact. IMF (2018) research 
highlights that, globally, women hold less than 20 per cent of board seats of banks. In addition, sanctions 
for non-compliance with corporate governance rules vary among EU member states. A well-researched 
example is the Norwegian gender quota case requiring all public limited companies to have at least 40 per 
cent of women on their boards of directors. After voluntary compliance failed, the requirement became 
regulation, with liquidation as a penalty for non-compliance. The merits of gender quotas have been 
intensely debated in the literature; a number of recent studies of the Norwegian case find evidence 
suggesting that it led to younger and less experienced boards and to a deterioration in firms’ operating 
performance (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren and Staubo, 2016; Garcia Lara et al., 2017). Since the 
financial crisis, a number of European countries, including Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and Germany, have promoted legislation aiming to increase gender diversity on corporate boards 
via the imposition of quotas. This drive has been reinforced by the European Commission (2012) 
proposals to achieve a 40 per cent participation rate for the under-represented gender in non-executive 
board-member positions in publicly listed companies by 2020. However, the regulatory framework of EU 
member states is still very fragmented, with some countries, such as the UK, arguing against mandatory 
quotas.  
In this paper, we evaluate the role of reforms that aim at promoting diversity on bank 
performance, measured by stock returns. To obtain a clearer picture of the impact of reforms, we also 
consider the standard deviation of stock returns as a proxy for performance variability, or risk (Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012). We model the impact of bank board reforms on bank returns and risk separately, as they 
are not necessarily linked. The impact of board reforms can manifest through different channels. A 
successful regulatory reform would result in higher returns and lower risk. However, a more diverse 
board could lead to both higher and lower returns. A more diverse board could increase returns thanks to 
more creativity and innovative ideas. Equally, it could decrease returns if decisions take longer as there is 
more conflict between board members. Similarly, increased diversity could lead to a better oversight and 
therefore decrease risk. On the other hand, board diversity could be achieved by electing younger or less 
qualified board members and, as a result, it could lead to increased volatility. In addition, it can be argued 
that any regulation that urges firms to enact changes to the way they are managed imposes some costs, 
both pecuniary and operational. These costs can affect firm performance, both in terms of lower returns 
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and / or increased volatility of returns. Therefore, the impact of board reform on bank risk and return is an 
empirical question. 
Departing from the current literature, which tends to exclude financial firms, we focus on the 
impact of board-related reforms on the performance of EU listed banks. Bank governance is considered 
to be different from that of non-financial firms primarily because of the existence of deposit insurance, 
implicit government guarantees, and prudential regulation (Laeven, 2013). Although there is a growing 
body of literature on the role of board diversity, including gender diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009, 
Hagendorff and Keasy, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Garcia-Meca et al., 2015; Sila et al., 2016), to the best 
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the effectiveness of reforms aiming at promoting 
diversity. We start our analysis with a thorough review of all the changes in corporate governance 
relating to board diversity in all EU member states. We analyse a comprehensive set of sources, including 
the industry codes of best practice, corporate governance codes, national legislation as well as EU and 
international organisation reports on corporate governance. We consider all types of board diversity 
reforms, from recommendations to foster best practice to legislative changes imposing mandatory quotas. 
This enables us to build a novel dataset of all diversity-related changes and assess their realised impact on 
the composition of listed firms’ board of directors and their effectiveness. Appendix 1 summarises all our 
sources and details the reforms considered in the analysis. 
The heterogeneity across European countries with regard to the occurrence, the timing and the 
type of these reforms facilitates the set-up of a treatment-based empirical approach that overcomes the 
endogeneity issues arising in attempting to explain the link between board diversity and bank 
performance. A difference-in-difference (DID) methodology is adopted as the appropriate framework to 
evaluate the effect of reforms on bank performance. As changes in the governance codes might take some 
time to be implemented at the firm level, potential changes in performance could materialise well after 
the reforms have become effective. We address the issue of timing and duration of the reform effect by 
separately scrutinising the change in bank performance in the years following the introduction of reforms 
as well as the cumulative effect over short- and longer-time windows. To assess the parallel trend 
assumption underlying our DID design, we conduct two placebo tests adopting pseudo reform years in 
the pre-and post-reform periods. It might be argued that the effectiveness of reforms depends on whether 
they are legally enforceable. We therefore examine the role of reform approaches by distinguishing 
between mandatory reforms - implemented through the imposition of quotas on the proportion of 
minority representatives - and recommendations, implemented through affirmative actions.  Moreover, 
the response of each bank to reforms could differ depending on whether a bank’s board is already diverse 
prior to the enactment of the reform, in which case the reform would not bring much change to the 
structure of the board and performance of the bank. Using a bank-specific diversity index that 
encompasses four different aspects of diversity (gender, age, nationality and employee representation), 
we identify diverse and non-diverse banks prior to the reforms. Naturally, we would expect the reforms to 
have a stronger performance effect on less diverse banks. In the same vein, we also differentiate between 
banks that have a strong women and employee board representation prior to the reforms. Finally, we 
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examine the success of reforms across different country-level conditions such as cultural, legal, and 
institutional background by differentiating between countries culturally more and less open to diversity 
and those with common and civil law legal systems.  
Using a difference-in-difference empirical framework that controls for country and time fixed 
effects and allows for bank-specific residual serial correlation, we find evidence that board diversity 
reforms impact positively on bank performance. The reforms significantly increase bank stock returns, 
and their impact is economically relevant. Their effect seems to materialise in the first three years after 
the enactment of the reform. On the other hand, our analysis shows that the reforms also increase stock 
return volatility, although the effect is more short-lived. We also find that the type of reform matters. In 
particular, the introduction of quotas for women and employees increases risk more compared to 
affirmative actions, although there is no differential impact on returns. We show that the effectiveness of 
reforms depends on a country’s prior institutional environment. Countries more open to diversity, 
countries with a common law system, and countries with higher economic freedom experience lower 
return volatility increases post-reform. Finally, reforms are more effective for banks that have ex-ante 
less heterogeneous boards.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the literature on 
exogenous changes in corporate governance by focusing on crisis-induced regulatory changes in the 
banking sector. Government-induced reforms are an important tool for fostering effective board practices 
by requiring or encouraging firms to invest in changes that might be opposed by their controlling 
shareholders. From an empirical viewpoint, focusing on a country-level shock to board composition that, 
albeit not necessarily exogenous in terms of timing or origin, is exogenous to the individual banks within 
a country, as its potential influence might not be aligned with shareholders’ intentions, provides an 
identification strategy that mitigates endogeneity concerns present in the examination of the relation 
between board characteristics and firm performance. We contribute to the literature by conducting an EU-
wide analysis exploiting the cross-country heterogeneity in governance practices and focusing on the 
more heavily regulated banking sector. Our hand-collected sample of bank board data and corporate 
governance reforms across the EU facilitates the analysis of different dimensions of diversity and their 
effects across different institutional backgrounds. The paper closest to ours in this respect is the study by 
Fauver et al. (2017) who present an analysis of the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value 
worldwide. The authors however do not address the issue of diversity and exclude from their analysis 
firms in regulated industries, such as banks. We also complement the growing body of literature on the 
impact of national culture and its role in the adoption of rules and regulation in the banking sector, 
suggesting that cultural differences can help explain financial behaviours (see among others, Guiso et al., 




The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 proposes our identification strategy. 
Section 3 discusses the data and the descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Identification strategy  
2.1 Board diversity reforms 
We begin our analysis by manually collecting information on all corporate governance reforms 
that took place in the EU member states between 2007 and 2014. This allows us to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance at the onset of the global financial 
crisis (2007) and the subsequent reform period. At the EU level, the crisis prompted a comprehensive 
revision of the corporate governance rules already in place, either in the form of directives or in the form 
of national regulation, to promote a culture that does not reward excessive risk-taking. To account for all 
the post-crisis regulatory reforms that explicitly emphasise the importance of diversity in the boardroom, 
we analysed a broad set of sources, from recommendations to foster best practice to legislative changes. 
Our starting point for governance reforms are publications from each member state’s relevant regulator. 
We then consulted corporate governance codes, European and international organisation reports on 
corporate governance. We complemented our investigation of each country’s changes to corporate 
governance practices with the analysis of the reports from the European Corporate Governance Institute 
(ECGI), the European Commission (EC), the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (Eurofound), the European Trade Union Institute, the United Nations Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and the World Bank Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). 
We focus on reforms that promote diversity in the board of directors of listed firms. The reason is 
twofold. First, reforms on board diversity were highly encouraged at the EU level. Secondly, diversity 
reforms can be uniquely and clearly identified among corporate governance reforms introduced in recent 
years (European Banking Authority, 2016). The identified reforms are either broad calls on diversity or in 
respect to specific aspects such as gender diversity, employee representation and so on. Not all reforms 
have the same impact on firm conduct: in some countries, reforms on corporate governance follow the 
enactment of new legislation and are therefore legally binding. In other countries, corporate governance 
codes establish best practices, but are not legally enforceable. 
We classify board diversity reforms into: (i) mandatory quotas, if a country’s regulator has 
chosen to impose a diversity quota (often a gender quota promoting the presence of women on boards of 
listed firms), and (ii) affirmative actions, if a country’s regulator has chosen to actively encourage board 
diversity, but not to impose it. We identify the relevant changes in the countries’ corporate governance 
codes and national legislations and the year in which these were implemented. In some countries, changes 
in corporate governance codes promoting diversity pre-date our sample period; in this case, the country is 
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classified as “no reform” during the sample period. In case of more than one change, we consider the date 
of the earliest introduction; if a country moves from an affirmative action to a mandatory quota (e.g., 
Italy), both dates are considered as relevant. Similarly, we distinguish between reforms which explicitly 
address the presence of women or employees on the board. Table 1 shows the diversity status at the 
beginning of the sample period and the identified reforms, by year and by country.  
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
There is a substantial heterogeneity in the type and timing of diversity reforms carried out by EU 
member states in the period under analysis. Between 2007 and 2014, we coded board diversity reforms as 
approved in fourteen countries. Most reforms explicitly encourage diversity, with two countries in our 
sample, France and Italy, imposing a gender quota. Seven countries did not undertake any board 
diversity-related changes in their national governance codes over the sample period (namely, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Spain, and Sweden). In five countries, rules encouraging 
board diversity or prescribing quota were already in place before 2007; only in Romania and Cyprus 
board diversity was not encouraged prior to the financial crisis and no changes were made in its 
aftermath. 
2.2 The difference-in-difference baseline model 
The following difference-in-difference (DID) approach is adopted to test the average effect of 
diversity-related reforms on bank performance:  
𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜀  
(1) 
where 𝑃  refers to the performance of bank i in country j in year t; 𝑋  is a matrix containing the k 
bank-specific control variables; and DREFORMjt is a dummy for the post-reform period in country j 
which takes the value of one when the first diversity reform is introduced and thereafter, and 0 otherwise. 
The noise εijt is assumed to be independently distributed from the k bank controls. In all regressions, we 
allow for serial dependence in the error correlation structure within banks by clustering standard errors at 
the bank level. Our parameter of interest is 𝛼 , where a positive estimate indicates an increase in bank 
performance following board reforms.  
Because our setting involves multiple treatment groups and time periods, we control for year 
fixed effects through a full set of time dummies and for unobserved group heterogeneity by including 
country fixed effects.2 Country instead of firm fixed effects are used to control for group effects to avoid 
                                                     
2 In robustness checks, we control for potential omitted variable bias caused by country effects using a set of 
country-specific variables, including: (i) the size of the economy, measured by the natural logarithm of gross 
domestic product per capita (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014); (ii) the concentration of the 
banking system, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2014); and (iii) a proxy for a country’s financial development, that is, the size of the capital 
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the issue of unreliable estimates of the coefficients of the bank controls caused by bank fixed effects 
absorbing most of the variation across banks. The country and year fixed effects identify the within-
country and within-year reform-induced change in bank performance between treatment banks and 
benchmark banks at a given time. The treatment group comprises banks in countries that have undergone 
changes in their national government codes related to board diversity. The control group comprises all 
firms from countries without reforms as of a particular time. Our DID set-up therefore compares changes 
in bank performance following the reforms with changes in bank performance in countries without board 
diversity reforms during the same years. With this set-up, we aim to isolate the effect of board diversity 
reforms from other factors potentially affecting bank performance. 
Our main bank performance measure is the bank the stock return (STOCK RETURN), computed 
using annualised average daily stock returns over a year. We also employ the standard deviation of the 
stock return (STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY) as a proxy for performance variability, or risk (see, among 
others, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). As an additional test, following the extant literature, we use Tobin’s Q 
(TOBIN’S Q) as a proxy for the bank charter value (Adams and Santos, 2006; Fauver et al., 2017). We 
define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the bank’s market value to its book value, where the bank’s market value 
is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity and 
use its natural logarithm in the analysis.  
To mitigate the effect of correlated omitted variable bias, we control for a set of bank-level 
characteristics that are typically related to bank performance (Adams and Santos, 2006; Laeven and 
Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). 
Specifically, we include bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. We also control for 
the possible effect of bank growth on performance by including total asset growth. Next, we control for 
asset composition using the loan to asset ratio and for the quality of the loan portfolio using the loan loss 
provision ratio. We control for funding sources by including the deposit and short-term funding to total 
assets ratio. We account for the impact of capital on bank performance by including the capital to total 
assets ratio. Finally, we control for the bank operating efficiency proxied by the cost to income ratio. The 
definition and construction of the variables used in the study are reported in Appendix 2. Correlations are 
reported in Appendix 3. 
2.3 The difference-in-difference model with time windows 
When evaluating the impact of reforms of bank performance, the timing of their implementation 
is of particular importance. To address the concern of confounding events and other factors potentially 
influencing bank performance that may contaminate the effect of reforms, we introduce in our DID 
framework time windows surrounding the introduction of reforms. It can be argued that the main 
                                                                                                                                                                          
markets, measured by the natural logarithm of the country’s market capitalisation. The results are qualitatively 
similar; we, therefore, opt for country fixed effects. 
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response of banks to changes in governance regulations will take place in the first three years. Hence, we 
split the post-reform dummy into two sub-periods of [0, +2] and [+3, T], where T denotes the end of the 
sample period.  
Additionally, we introduce in our DID framework reform timing dummies that track the effect of 
the reforms in the years after they become effective. Specifically, we test whether there is a significant 
change in bank performance in specific years following the reform by replacing the post-reform period 
dummy with the set of dummy variables DREFORMt, t = (0, +1, +2), which equal one for the year in 
which the reform is enacted, the one and two years after the reform becomes effective, and the post-
reform window dummy [+3, T], which equals one for the third year and onwards, until the end of the 
sample period at time T. 
2.4 The role of reform approach, national culture and bank diversity status   
We then test whether the effectiveness of reforms depends on the approach taken, that is, through 
the imposition of quotas or affirmative actions. We do so by augmenting Equation (1) with the interaction 
between the post-reform period dummy and a variable indicating whether the reform imposes a quota 
(DQUOTA). During our sample period we encounter two instances were quotas were implemented – in 
France in 2008 and 2011 where the government introduced quotas on the representation of employees 
and women respectively, and in Italy in 2012 where quotas on women were implemented.3 All other 
reforms involved affirmative actions, simply encouraging board diversity.  
We also examine whether the effectiveness of reforms depends on national characteristics such as 
a country’s prior institutional environment. In doing so, we look at differences in national culture that 
define the extent to which a country embraces openness to diversity, the extent of economic freedom as 
well as the legal system and structure.  
It is expected that reforms might affect some banks more than others. If a bank’s board is already 
diverse prior to the enactment of the reform, then the reform would not bring much change to the 
structure of the board and performance of the bank. In this spirit, we test whether the ex-ante diversity 
status of banks can explain differences in the effectiveness of reforms on bank performance. 
3 Sample and descriptive statistics 
For all the EU countries in our sample, we collect data on their publicly listed commercial banks 
for the period 2007-2014. We focus on listed banks because of the assumption that these institutions are 
                                                     
3 Employee quota was introduced in France in 2008 requiring the appointment of one or more employee 
directors from among employee shareholders. Gender quota legislation followed in 2011, which imposed a 20% 
women presence in the board. The women proportion was progressively raised to 40% by 2015. In Italy, gender 




subject to more stringent regulatory controls and compliance requirements; it also enhances cross-country 
comparability and augments data availability in terms of board composition; in addition, publicly listed 
banks share internationally adopted accounting standards; finally, the recent changes to corporate 
governance regulation and codes of conduct affect mostly publicly listed companies. We collect banks’ 
stock market data from Thomson Eikon, balance sheet and income statement data from Orbis Bank Focus 
(Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings), and corporate governance data from BoardEx. We exclude banks 
with missing total assets and those with less than three observations over the sample period. To mitigate 
the impact of outliers, we apply 99 per cent winsorisation to stock return, stock return volatility, bank 
balance sheet and income statement data.4 The final sample consists of 84 publicly listed banks (620 
bank-year observations) from 21 EU countries over the period of 2007-2014, which covers 60 per cent of 
the total assets of these countries’ banking systems at the end of the sample period. Details on the sample 
composition are provided in Appendix 4. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the selected performance measures, board, bank-
specific and country-specific characteristics for the sample. Looking at performance measures, the 
average banks has a stock return of 4 per cent, with a yearly standard deviation of 40 per cent.  
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
When considering board diversity, it is important to look beyond the gender dimension.5 
Following the EBA (2017) guidelines, we distinguish four separate dimensions: (i) gender diversity; (ii) 
age; (iii) nationality; (iv) employee representation. Boards appear to be male-dominated, with female 
directors constituting only 13 per cent of the total board members. Employee representatives account for 
only 8 per cent of the board. On average, foreign directors form 20 per cent of board members. Directors' 
average age is 57 years, with the youngest board member being 35 and the oldest 69. We capture the 
overall level of diversity for each board of directors by constructing a bank-specific board diversity index 
inspired by Li and Wahid (2017) that relies on the above four aspects of diversity. These variables are 
converted into discrete score variables based on their respective decile within the sample distribution. The 
diversity index for each bank-year is computed as 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑋 = ∑ 𝐷 , where j = 1,…,4 
denotes the dimension of diversity and 𝐷 = (1,2, … ,10) is the decile of the jth dimension observation it 
                                                     
4 As a robustness check, we re-run all models dropping all bank observations with stock returns and volatility 
of stock return larger than the 1 per cent level at both tails of their distributions. Results are qualitatively similar. 
5 The EBA (2017) Guidelines, Title V, Diversity within the Management Body, state: “The diversity policy 
should at least refer to the following diversity aspects: educational and professional background, gender, age and, 
in particular for institutions that are active internationally, geographical provenance, unless the inclusion of the 
aspect of geographical provenance is unlawful under the laws of the Member State”. Our choice of diversity 
indicators encompasses all the aspects proposed by the regulators with the exception of educational and professional 
background, due to data limitation. However, we use employee representation as a proxy of professional 
background and experience. The EBA (2017) document arguments that employee representation in the boardroom 
could also be seen as a positive way of enhancing diversity, as it adds a different perspective and knowledge of the 
internal workings of companies. 
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falls into. The average value of the index in our sample of banks is 0.47, with values ranging between 0.1 
and 0.88, indicating a high degree of heterogeneity in the diversity of the sampled banks’ boards. 6  
Looking at the bank-specific characteristics, the sample banks are relatively large, with average 
asset value of around 25 billion euro, and asset growth rate of 7 per cent per year. In terms of balance 
sheet structure, 59 per cent of the sample banks’ assets is invested in loans; their main source of funding 
is deposit and short-term liabilities (67 per cent of total assets), while only around 7 per cent of their total 
assets is funded by equity capital.  
Turning to the country-specific characteristics, mandatory reforms were implemented in 13 per 
cent of the sampled countries; 70 per cent of the countries adopt a civil law system and about 55 per cent 
have a value of the Hofstede index, our proxy for a country’s openness to diversity, and of the economic 
freedom index, below the sample mean.  
Interestingly, the reforms seem to have had the intended impact with the European banks’ boards 
becoming more diverse in the post-reform period, as shown in Table 3. 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
Table 3, Panel A, presents the test of differences in pre- and post-reform means across all 
diversity reforms. We focus on changes in the diversity index, treated as a gauge of the level of overall 
board diversity and on changes in gender diversity, the type of diversity most widely discussed. We 
notice a significant increase in the average fraction of women in the boards, as well as in the overall 
board diversity index post-reform. The average representation of women increases from 7 per cent to 14 
per cent of the board, while the average of the diversity index increases from 0.41 to 0.5. In Panels B and 
C, we decompose the reforms into affirmative actions and mandatory reforms (gender quotas), 
respectively, to investigate whether banks respond differently to non-enforceable reforms. Despite the 
heterogeneity in both the type and the timing of reforms among the sample countries, at the pooled level, 
both the board diversity index and the fraction of women on the board increase after affirmative actions 
are adopted. A more pronounced positive effect is linked to mandatory reforms that specifically target 
gender diversity. The statistics reveal that the gender quotas adopted in France and Italy entail a greater 
increase in board diversity than the affirmative actions, which is reflected in the increased mean 
differential of female representation. A country-by-country breakdown of the impact of reforms on board 
diversity is presented in Appendix 5. 
 
 
                                                     
6 The construction of the index meets the four criteria that have been suggested for a good diversity measure: 
(i) it has a zero point to represent complete homogeneity, (ii) it is positively related to diversity, (iii) it does not 
assume negative values, and (iv) it is bounded between 0 and 1. In addition, the index is a suitable measure of 
diversity for categorical variables that are skewed in a proportion of one category (that is, gender or employee 
representation), as mapping onto deciles mitigates the impact of large values. 
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4 Empirical results 
The main aim of our analysis is to examine the impact of board diversity reforms on bank 
performance. 
4.1 Do board diversity reforms impact bank performance?  
Table 4 reports the estimation results of Equation (1), where performance is measured by the 
annualised average daily stock return and risk is proxied by the standard deviation of stock return. The 
effect of reforms is captured by the coefficient of the post-reform period indicator. Model (1) is the 
baseline model, which includes the post-reform period dummy, bank-specific controls as well as country 
and year fixed effects. In order to disentangle the influence of reforms from other attributes and events 
that may affect bank performance, we next restrict the sample period to the years surrounding the 
introduction of the reforms. Specifically, Model (2) splits the post-reform period dummy into two sub-
periods of [0, +2], capturing up to two years after the reform becomes effective, and [+3, T], where T 
denotes the end of the sample, capturing the subsequent years after the reform. Model (3) introduces 
reform timing indicator variables that track the year-specific effect of the reforms. Specifically, we 
replace the post-reform period dummy with a set of dummies DREFORMt, where t = (0, +1, +2), which 
take the value of one for the year in which the reform becomes effective, one and two years after, 
respectively, and the post-reform window dummy [+3, T], which equals one for the third year and 
onwards after the reform becomes effective. 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
We find that the coefficient on DREFORM in Model (1) is positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level for stock returns suggesting that bank stock returns increase following board diversity 
reforms. The impact of DREFORM is also economically significant, with the stock returns increasing by 
15 per cent, on average, following the reforms.  
The results for Model (2) confirm the significant increase of bank stock returns following board 
reforms. The findings further reveal that the response to changes in governance regulation takes place in 
the first three years after they become effective. Specifically, the coefficient on the post-reform window 
dummy DREFORM[0,+2] is positive and significant for stock returns, whereas the coefficient on 
DREFORM[+3, T] is insignificant. The results of Model (3) corroborate the absence of a long-term effect of 
board reforms on bank stock returns: the coefficients on DREFORM0 and DREFORM+1 are positive and 
significant but insignificant on DREFORM+2. 
Looking at the results for the standard deviation of stock returns, in Model (1) we find a positive 
and significant coefficient on DREFORM suggesting that risk increases after the enactment of the 
reforms. The results of Model (2) suggest that the risk-increasing effect is limited to the first two years 
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post-reform. This is further corroborated by Model (3), where the year-by-year results confirm that the 
reforms’ impact on stock return volatility, albeit positive and significant, is limited to the reform year and 
one year post-reform. This indicates that while reforms might impose costs leading to increased volatility 
of returns, this negative effect is short lived. 
For the control variables, the results show that stock returns are higher among banks with smaller 
and better-quality loan portfolios, and greater operating efficiency; whereas risk is higher among banks 
that are larger and less capitalised, hold loan portfolios of poorer quality, and operate less efficiently. 
These findings are generally consistent with prior studies (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 
2014). 
4.2 Reform approach  
Our results thus far suggest a positive relation between board diversity reforms and bank 
performance, albeit risk tends to increase in the short term. However, this effect may be influenced by 
regulators’ different approaches to implementing reforms. For example, mandatory reforms such as the 
imposition of quotas force all firms to comply within a pre-determined time period thereby potentially 
imposing higher costs. On the other hand, affirmative actions allow firms a choice as to how and when to 
adopt to the new rules through their existing structures. To investigate the role of the approach taken on 
the reform effectiveness, we augment Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform 
period dummy (DREFORM) and the quota dummy (DQUOTA) that takes the value of one when a quota 
is introduced. The estimated coefficient measures the incremental impact of mandatory reforms on bank 
performance relative to affirmative actions. Table 5 presents the results. 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
Remarkably, the findings of this analysis show that the reform approach has no significant 
explanatory power in relation to the effect of reforms on bank stock returns as the coefficient on the 
interaction term DREFORM x DQUOTA is insignificant. Nonetheless, it does emerge positive and 
statistically significant for the standard deviation of stock return, suggesting that the introduction of quota 
increases the volatility of stock returns. In other words, when regulators introduce mandatory reforms, 
bank risk increases. This finding is consistent with Bøhren and Staubo (2015), who suggest that forcing 
radical gender balance on corporate boards through the introduction of quotas is negatively associated 
with firm performance. The authors argue that a firm performs worse the more its post-reform board 





4.3 Additional analysis 
4.3.1 National culture 
We next examine whether the effectiveness of board diversity reforms is driven by national 
culture. In so doing, we build upon a stream of the literature that focuses on the links between national 
culture and financial decision-making (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014). 
In particular, we look at whether reforms are more successful in countries with cultural 
backgrounds that are more welcoming to diversity. Differences in cultural origins define national 
attitudes towards diversity in general and may be able to explain part of the heterogeneity in the 
effectiveness of board diversity reforms. We capture a country’s openness to diversity using the six 
cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1983) - power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence - and viewed as good indicators of the 
extent to which a society supports diversity (Newbury and Yakova, 2006; Chakrabarty, 2009).7 Using 
data from Hofstede et al. (2010), we derive an overall index as the average of the six Hofstede 
dimensions and form an Hofstede dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the value of the 
Hofstede index is above the sample mean (higher national openness to diversity) and zero otherwise 
(lower national openness to diversity).8 While our index is a snapshot of a country’s cultural openness to 
diversity at a particular point in time (that is, at the beginning of our sample period) and a country’s 
cultural aspects change over time, we argue that attitudes and beliefs transform over generations and 
therefore the overall change in national culture is slow. 
To conduct the test, we augment Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform 
dummy (DREFORM) and the Hofstede dummy (DHOF) that takes the value of one for countries more 
open to diversity. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. 
We find that national culture has no additional impact on the effect of board diversity reforms on 
banks’ stock returns. However, the significance of the interaction term for the standard deviation of stock 
returns suggests a positive incremental effect of reforms in countries more open to diversity, that is, in 
these countries, reforms decrease bank risk. Countries’ cultural traits are of fundamental importance for 
the quality of formal institutions and for the effective implementation of reforms, even in societies as 
highly developed as the EU member states (Gutmann and Voigt, 2018). Cultural traits enhancing 
equality, independence from political influence or individual status have also been proved to be 
conducive to economic growth (Voigt et al., 2015). This finding suggests that a country’s openness to 
                                                     
7 For instance, a society that welcomes individualism, long-term orientation, and indulgence in the form of 
deviations from strict social norms is associated with a greater support of diversity. In contrast, a society where 
masculinity, power concentration, and uncertainty avoidance prevail is considered to be less open to diversity. 
8 The values of our Hofstede index range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating countries more open to 
diversity. For power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, greater openness to diversity is indicated by 
lower values; hence we use (100 – Dimension’s value) when constructing the Hofstede index.  
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diversity strengthens the effect of board diversity reforms on banks’ overall performance and is, 
therefore, an important factor to be considered when assessing the impact of reforms (Frijins et al., 2016).  
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
4.3.2 Legal framework 
To further analyse the impact of country-level conditions on the effectiveness of board diversity 
reforms, we examine the country’s legal origin. An extensive literature starting with La Porta et al. (1997) 
supports the view that the legal framework adopted by a country is an important factor in explaining 
investor protection and capital market development. La Porta et al. (1998) find that civil laws give 
investors weaker legal rights than common laws, supporting the idea that legal systems matter for 
corporate governance and that firms have to adapt to the limitations of the legal systems that they operate 
in. More recently, Koirala et al. (2018) find that in countries with a weaker market mechanism of 
corporate governance (such as civil law countries), corporate governance reforms substitute the weaker 
market forces of corporate scrutiny and stimulate value-enhancing risk-taking behaviour.  
To examine the impact of board diversity reforms across different legal origins, we augment 
Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform dummy (DREFORM) and the common 
law dummy (DCOM) that indicates the country’s legal framework by taking the value of one for common 
law countries (Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Fauver at al., 2017). Table 6, Panel B, presents the results. 
We find that the impact of reforms on banks’ stock returns is similar in civil and common law 
countries as the coefficient on interaction term DREFORM x DCOM is insignificant. However, the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant for the standard deviation of stock return, thus 
suggesting that reforms decrease risk in common law counties, in contrast to the risk-increasing effect 
they have in civil law countries. These findings are generally consistent with prior literature and may 
reflect the greater uncertainty around the implementation of reforms and the relatively poorer quality of 
investor protection institutions in civil law countries which prevent firms in those countries from accruing 
the full benefits of the reforms (Fauver et al., 2017; Koirala et al., 2018). 
4.3.3 Alternative measures of national and legal system characteristics 
To investigate whether national and legal system characteristics influence the impact of reforms 
on bank performance and risk, we test two additional measures widely used in the literature - economic 
freedom, and legal structure and property rights. Economic freedom may constitute a relevant factor in 
shaping the banking system and play a role on the impact of reforms on banks. As a proxy for economic 
freedom, we consider the economic freedom index reported annually by the Fraser Institute, which 
combines five dimensions of economic freedom: (i) size of government; (ii) legal structure and property 
rights; (iii) sound money; (iv) freedom to trade internationally; and (v) regulation of credit, labour, and 
business. The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score indicates a greater economic freedom. To 
conduct this test, we augment Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform dummy 
16 
 
(DREFORM) and the economic freedom dummy (DFREEDOM), which takes the value of one if a 
country’s economic freedom index is greater than the sample mean. 
Our proxy for legal structure and property rights is based on the corresponding dimension of the 
economic freedom index which in turn is formed by several components: (i) the rule of law; (ii) security 
of property rights; (iii) an independent and unbiased judiciary; and (iv) impartial and effective 
enforcement of the law. The legal structure and property rights dimension ranges from 1 to 10, where a 
higher score indicates a clearer definition and more enhanced protection of rights over financial and other 
assets. To conduct this test, we augment Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform 
dummy (DREFORM) and the legal structure and property rights dummy (DLEGAL), which takes the 
value of one if a country’s legal structure and property rights score is greater than the sample mean. 
The results of both tests are reported in Table 7. 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
The results confirm the positive impact of reforms on stock return and corroborate our earlier 
findings about the role played by national culture on the effectiveness of reforms. Board diversity reforms 
have a lower impact on bank performance in countries with greater economic freedom. In other words, 
banks in countries with low levels of economic freedom benefit more from the reform-driven corporate 
governance changes. Looking at the effect on risk, reforms are found to reduce stock price volatility in 
countries with greater economic freedom relative to countries with low levels of economic freedom, as 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term DREFORM x DFREEDOM. 
Nonetheless, the magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that the overall impact of reforms on risk is 
negligible for banks operating in an environment of high economic freedom. The same results hold in 
countries with a clear definition and enhanced protection rights over financial and other assets: reforms 
do not increase risk, if anything, they have a beneficial effect on stock return volatility (DREFORM x 
DLEGAL in Table 7 - Panel B). 
4.3.4 Bank board diversity pre-reform 
The impact of board diversity reforms may also be influenced by the ex-ante composition of the 
bank’s board of directors. Banks whose boards are already in line with regulatory requirements are bound 
to be less impacted by reforms. We expect banks with less diverse boards to be forced to implement 
greater board changes and therefore to exhibit greater impact of reforms on performance as diversity 
brings a variety of experiences and different sets of information to the boardroom (Jensen, 1993; 
Anderson et al., 2011).  
To capture the level of board diversity in the pre-reform period, we construct a pre-reform diversity 
dummy (DDIV_PRE), which takes the value of one if the average value of the board diversity index 
(BOARDDIVX) over the two years prior to the reform exceeds a threshold.  The latter is defined as the 
sample mean of the diversity index in 2007, which marks the beginning of our sample period, to capture 
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the level of diversity across EU banks’ boards of directors, just before changes in board rules and 
regulations were triggered by the global financial crisis. The proportion of banks with above average 
board diversity in the pre-reform period is 31 per cent as reported in the statistics in Table 2. We then 
augment Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform dummy (DREFORM) and the 
pre-reform board diversity dummy (DDIV_PRE). The results are reported in Table 8 (Model (1)). 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
The findings support our expectations that banks whose boards are already in line with regulatory 
requirements are less impacted by reforms, as suggested by the significant and negative coefficients on 
the interaction term DREFORM x DDIV_PRE. For banks with ex-ante more diverse boards, the effect of 
reforms on performance remains positive, but less economically relevant, whereas the effect on risk is 
virtually zero. 
In addition, we examine the impact of reforms on banks that are already more diverse in two 
specific aspects - gender and employee representation. We introduce two dummies (DWOM_PRE and 
DEMPL_PRE) that capture gender and employee representation on the sample banks’ boards directly 
before the reform. Following the same approach, DWOM_PRE takes the value of one if the fraction of 
women on the board of directors (BOARDWOM) over the two years prior to the reform is above the 
sample mean of 2007. Similarly, DEMPL_PRE takes the value of one if the fraction of employees on the 
board of directors (BOARDEMPL) over the two years prior to the reform is above the sample mean of 
2007. We expect banks with less diverse boards in terms of gender and employee representation to be 
forced to implement greater changes and therefore to experience a greater impact of reforms on their 
performance. The results are reported in Table 8 (Models (2) and (3)).  
The results indicate that the extent of women representation in the board does not affect the 
effectiveness of reforms. However, banks that already have a higher than average proportion of 
employees on board emerge as less affected by reforms. Overall the findings point towards a more 
notable effect of reforms in banks that do not “comply” with diversity calls. 
4.3.5 Parallel trend assumption 
The parallel trend assumption states that, in the absence of treatment, the average change in the 
dependent variable would have been the same for the treatment and control groups. To assess the validity 
of the parallel trend assumption underlying our DID design, following Fauver et al. (2017), we conduct 
two tests using pseudo reform years during both the pre- and post-diversity reform periods. In our 
sample, the reform year varies depending on the country under scrutiny. We design a placebo test that 
accounts for these differences through the construction of a country-specific dummy for the post-pseudo 
reform period which takes the value of one in the year when the pseudo reform is introduced and 
thereafter (DREFORM). The pseudo reform year should be as far as possible from the year of the actual 
reform (T) in order to avoid event-induced contamination in the pseudo reform samples, but on the other 
hand it should allow enough observations to assess any significant changes in the dependent variable. The 
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first placebo test restricts the analyses to the pre-reform periods and sets the pseudo reform effective year 
as four years prior to the actual reform year. The second placebo test restricts the analyses to the post-
reform periods and sets the pseudo reform year as three years after the actual reform effective year. Given 
that our sample covers the period from 2007-2014 adopting a T-4 and T+3 windows ensures an adequate 
trade-off between event-induced contamination and treatment identification.9 The results of the two 
placebo tests are reported in Table 9. 
  < Insert Table 9 about here > 
We find no evidence of changes in firm value subsequent to the pseudo reform years. The 
coefficients on the pseudo reform dummy are all insignificant at conventional levels in both tests. Thus, 
these findings suggest that, in the absence of treatment, our treatment and control samples exhibit a 
similar trend in stock returns and volatility of stock returns. 
4.3.6 Alternative dependent variable 
To further examine the impact of board diversity reforms on bank performance, we supplement 
our analysis by examining the impact of reforms on bank value. If reforms are beneficial for bank 
performance, we expect them to be positively associated with bank charter value. We capture bank 
charter value using a proxy for Tobin’s Q (Adams and Santos, 2006; Fauver et al., 2017). We define 
Tobin’s Q (TOBIN’S Q) as the ratio of the bank’s market value to its book value, where the bank’s 
market value is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity, and use its natural logarithm as our dependent variable. We then repeat the analysis in Tables 4, 
6, and 7 by replacing the dependent variable with Tobin’s Q. The results are reported in Table 10. 
  < Insert Table 10 about here > 
Overall, reforms do not seem to impact banks’ charter value. We find a positive incremental 
effect of reforms in countries more open to diversity as suggested by the significant coefficient on the 
interaction term DREFORM x DHOF in Model (3); that is, in these countries, reforms increase bank 
value. We also find that while reforms appear to have no impact in countries adopting a civil law 
framework, they significantly enhance bank value in countries with a common law system as suggested 
by the significant coefficient on the interaction term DREFORM x DCOM in Model (4). Finally, we find 
that reforms have a positive impact on banks with ex-ante more diverse boards as suggested by the 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term DREFORM x DDIV_PRE in Model (5). This 
                                                     
9 Given that our sample period covers 8 years and that reforms have been generally introduced soon after the 
financial crisis, we consider a 4-year window for the first placebo test. As our sample is shorter on the other end 
(2014 marks the end of the sample period), we consider a shorter window of T+3 in order to have enough post-
pseudo reform observations. In addition, as the results of the analysis reported in Table 4 show that the impact of 
reform is short-lived (no effect in the T+3 window in any specification), a shorter time window facilitates the 
identification of the effect of reforms on treated banks. We have also run the placebo test with a T+4 window 
(unreported due to space constraints) and the results are largely unchanged. 
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finding is consistent with Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013). As far as bank charter 
value is concerned, the more diverse range of knowledge and perspective in the boardroom offered by 
cultural diversity outweigh, on average, the negative aspects.  
5 Conclusion 
We examine the performance value of board diversity reforms for EU banks in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. Our analysis has important implications for the banking sector in the light of on-
going reforms of corporate governance. Overall, our results show the reforms had the intended impact, as 
diversity in bank boards has increased over the sample period. Reforms, and subsequent changes in board 
composition, have had a positive impact of bank stock return, albeit typically accompanied by an increase 
in volatility in the short term.  
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we document that reforms increase bank stock 
returns and their volatility, and that this effect materialises in the first three years after the reforms 
become effective. We find that the type of reforms matters. While the impact of reforms on bank stock 
returns is similar across diversity quotas and affirmative actions, the introduction of quotas increases 
bank risk. We also find that the effectiveness of reforms depends on a country's prior institutional 
environment and, in particular, its cultural openness to diversity and legal origin. Interestingly the impact 
of reforms on stock return volatility is lower in countries more open to diversity, countries with a 
common law system and countries with higher economic freedom. These results are robust to various 
specifications. Finally, the reforms appear to entail a stronger valuation effect on banks that ex-ante have 
less diverse boards.   
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Table 1 Board diversity reforms  
  




2014 diversity status 
(3) 





Austria 0 2009  1 
Belgium 0 2009  1 
Cyprus 0   0 
Czech Republic 1   1 
Denmark 0 2008  1 
Finland 1   1 
France 1 2008 2008 and 2011 2 
Germany 0 2009  1 
Greece 0 2011  1 
Hungary 2   2 
Ireland 0 2013  1 
Italy 0 2011 2012 2 
Lithuania 0 2010  1 
Malta 0 2014  1 
Netherlands 0 2008  1 
Poland 0 2010  1 
Portugal 0 2012  1 
Romania 0   0 
Spain 2   2 
Sweden 2   2 
United Kingdom 0 2010  1 
This table presents board diversity reforms by country. Column (1) reports the diversity status in 2007; Column (2) 
reports the year in which the reform becomes effective; and Column (3) reports the diversity status in 2014. The 
diversity status takes the value of 0 when board diversity is not addressed in the national corporate governance codes 
and/or in national legislation; 1 when board diversity is encouraged in the national corporate governance codes and / or 
in national legislation; and 2 when board diversity is mandatory (e.g., a diversity quota) in the national corporate 
governance codes and / or in national legislation. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
 No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance measures      
STOCK RETURN 636 0.04 0.59 -1.64 2.11 
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 636 0.40 0.21 0.04 1.22 
TOBIN’S Q 635 0.41 1.00 -0.12 4.83 
      
Board characteristics      
BOARDWOM 566 0.13 0.11 0 0.6 
BOARDEMPL 566 0.08 0.13 0 0.6 
BOARDNATMIX 538 0.20 0.20 0 0.8 
BOARDAGE 566 57.46 4.48 35.8 69.5 
CVBOARDAGE 566 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.90 
BOARDDIVX 538 0.47 0.17 0.1 0.88 
DDIV_PRE 538 0.31 0.46 0 1 
      
Bank-specific characteristics      
TOTAL ASSET 645 24.84 1.98 20.20 28.36 
ASSET GROWTH 641 0.07 0.16 -0.24 0.81 
LOAN / ASSET 645 0.59 0.19 0.07 0.85 
DEPOSIT / ASSET 645 0.67 0.15 0.25 0.92 
EQUITY / ASSET 645 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.16 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS 632 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 
COST / INCOME 642 0.61 0.17 0.34 1.50 
      
Country-specific characteristics      
DQUOTA 645 0.13 0.34 0 1 
DCOM 645 0.15 0.36 0 1 
DHOF 629 0.44 0.50 0 1 
DFREEDOM 645 0.46 0.50 0 1 
DLEGAL 645 0.50 0.50 0 1 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for the full sample period 
2007-2014 (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values). 
Definitions of all the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
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Table 3 Pre- and post-reform board diversity  
 
          Pre-reform Post-reform     
Panel A: All reforms   No. of 
Obs. 
Mean   No. of 
Obs. 
Mean   Difference in 
Means 
BOARDDIVX 166 0.41  255 0.5  0.09*** 
BOARDWOM  171 0.07   276 0.14   0.07*** 
Panel B: Affirmative actions                   
BOARDDIVX 111 0.44  177 0.53  0.09*** 
BOARDWOM 161 0.09   144 0.15   0.06*** 
Panel C: Mandatory reforms                    
BOARDDIVX 67 0.33  66 0.46  0.13*** 
BOARDWOM 82 0.06   60 0.17   0.11*** 
The table reports the summary statistics (number of observations, mean, and differences in means) for the board 
diversity variables used in the analysis for countries where reforms were implemented during the sample period. 
Panel A compares board diversity measures before and after all types of reforms promoting diversity. Panel B 
reports the statistics for countries where affirmative actions aimed at encouraging diversity were introduced. Panel 
C reports the statistics for countries where gender diversity quotas were introduced. The t-statistics for the mean 
differential are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 








Table 4 The impact of board diversity reforms on bank performance 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
DREFORM 0.1466**   0.0457**   
 (2.36)   (2.00)   
DREFORM[0;+2]  0.1473**   0.0459**  
  (2.45)   (2.01)  
DREFORM[+3;T]  -0.0320 -0.0856  -0.0071 -0.0175 
  (-0.29) (-0.75)  (-0.21) (-0.46) 
DREFORM0   0.1817**   0.0513** 
   (2.54)   (2.07) 
DREFORM+1   0.1533*   0.0497* 
   (1.81)   (1.95) 
DREFORM+2   0.0265   0.0214 
   (0.35)   (0.65) 
SIZE -0.0088 -0.0094 -0.0097 0.0240*** 0.0238*** 0.0238*** 
 (-0.54) (-0.57) (-0.59) (3.27) (3.28) (3.28) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.1710 -0.1750 -0.1730 0.0105 0.0093 0.0094 
 (-1.56) (-1.55) (-1.53) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) 
LOAN / ASSET -0.2761*** -0.2625** -0.2570** -0.0652 -0.0612 -0.0600 
 (-2.73) (-2.51) (-2.41) (-1.36) (-1.31) (-1.29) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.1054 -0.1304 -0.1453 0.0763 0.0689 0.0661 
 (-0.64) (-0.77) (-0.84) (1.01) (0.95) (0.91) 
EQUITY / ASSET 0.2978 0.3288 0.3246 -0.7271* -0.7179* -0.7182* 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (-1.99) (-1.97) (-1.98) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS -9.0943*** -9.7288*** -9.7111*** 6.4881*** 6.3005*** 6.3037*** 
 (-3.55) (-3.89) (-3.93) (6.12) (5.90) (5.85) 
COST / INCOME -0.4769*** -0.4902*** -0.5175*** 0.2448*** 0.2409*** 0.2359*** 
 (-2.73) (-2.74) (-2.84) (4.41) (4.41) (4.27) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 620 620 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.458 0.463 0.465 0.595 0.599 0.599 
The table reports the results of the effects of board diversity reforms (DREFORM) on bank stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk (STOCK 
RETURN VOLATILITY). Model (1) presents the baseline results; Model (2) splits the post-reform period into two post-reform windows [0,+2] 
and [+3,T], where T denotes the end of the sample period; Model (3) considers separately the effect of the reforms in the years following their 
introduction (0, +1, +2) and [+3,T], where T denotes the end of the sample period. Variables are winsorised at the 99% level of the bank-year 
distribution. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Table 5 The effect of reform approach: Quota vs. affirmative action 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.1391* 0.0302 
 (1.98) (1.20) 
DREFORM x DQUOTA 0.0283 0.0582** 
 (0.28) (1.99) 
SIZE -0.0090 0.0237*** 
 (-0.55) (3.26) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.1702 0.0119 
 (-1.55) (0.22) 
LOAN / ASSET -0.2737*** -0.0603 
 (-2.66) (-1.26) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.1104 0.0659 
 (-0.65) (0.86) 
EQUITY / ASSET 0.3349 -0.6508* 
 (0.32) (-1.78) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS -9.1865*** 6.2986*** 
 (-3.56) (5.82) 
COST / INCOME -0.4686** 0.2619*** 
 (-2.61) (4.67) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.457 0.598 
The table reports the results of the impact of the reform approach on the effect of board diversity reforms on bank 
stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk (STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY). The model includes the interaction 
between the post-diversity reform dummy and the quota dummy, DREFORM x DQUOTA, which takes the value of 
1 if the reforms are mandatory. Variables are winsorised at the 99% level of the bank-year distribution. The t-
statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 






Table 6 The effect of country-level conditions: National culture and legal framework 
Panel A: National culture - Openness to diversity 
  STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.1764** 0.1127*** 
 (2.44) (4.43) 
DREFORM x DHOF -0.0236 -0.1612*** 
 (-0.21) (-4.73) 
SIZE -0.0098 0.0223*** 
 (-0.58) (3.14) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.1530 0.0272 
 (-1.41) (0.53) 
LOAN / ASSET  -0.2746*** -0.0683 
 (-2.90) (-1.55) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.0367 0.0441 
 (-0.24) (0.63) 
EQUITY / ASSET -0.2897 -0.5708 
 (-0.32) (-1.56) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS  -10.4613*** 5.2950*** 
 (-3.81) (4.92) 
COST / INCOME -0.4422** 0.2535*** 
 (-2.49) (4.66) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 604 604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.526 
 
Panel B: Legal framework - Common law vs. civil law 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.1345** 0.0709*** 
 (2.01) (3.31) 
DREFORM x DCOM 0.0774 -0.1612*** 
 (0.49) (-3.26) 
SIZE -0.0082 0.0227*** 
 (-0.50) (3.17) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.1726 0.0138 
 (-1.57) (0.26) 
LOAN / ASSET  -0.2769*** -0.0634 
 (-2.74) (-1.35) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.1035 0.0723 
 (-0.62) (0.98) 
EQUITY / ASSET 0.2585 -0.6452* 
 (0.25) (-1.81) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS  -8.8802*** 6.0418*** 
 (-3.50) (5.67) 
COST / INCOME -0.4808*** 0.2528*** 
 (-2.75) (4.50) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.458 0.607 
The table reports the results of the effect of different country-level institutional characteristics on the impact of board 
diversity reforms on bank stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk (STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY). The model in 
Panel A includes the interaction between the post-diversity reform dummy (DREFORM) and the country-specific 
Hofstede dummy (DHOF), which takes the value of 1 if the sum of the six Hofstede dimensions of national culture is 
above the sample mean (higher national openness to diversity) and 0 otherwise (lower national openness to diversity). The 
model in Panel B includes the interaction between the post-diversity reform dummy (DREFORM) and the legal 
background dummy (DCOM), which takes the value of 1 for countries with a common law framework and 0 for countries 
with a civil law framework. Variables are winsorised at the 99% level of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics 
calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 




Table 7 Additional effect of country-level conditions: Economic freedom and legal framework 
Panel A: Economic freedom index 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.2078*** 0.0941*** 
 (3.12) (3.92) 
DREFORM x DFREEDOM -0.1311* -0.1038*** 
 (-1.75) (-3.96) 
SIZE -0.0098 0.0232*** 
 (-0.60) (3.25) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.1694 0.0117 
 (-1.54) (0.22) 
LOAN / ASSET -0.2743*** -0.0638 
 (-2.66) (-1.40) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.1230 0.0623 
 (-0.73) (0.86) 
EQUITY / ASSET 0.3953 -0.6499* 
 (0.38) (-1.82) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS -9.6172*** 6.0742*** 
 (-3.83) (5.73) 
COST / INCOME -0.4594*** 0.2587*** 
 (-2.65) (4.49) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460 0.609 
Panel B: Legal system and property rights 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.1826*** 0.0996*** 
 (2.68) (3.81) 
DREFORM x DLEGAL -0.0855 -0.1281*** 
 (-1.03) (-4.00) 
SIZE -0.0093 0.0233*** 
 (-0.57) (3.27) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.1679 0.0151 
 (-1.53) (0.29) 
LOAN / ASSET -0.2743*** -0.0624 
 (-2.67) (-1.36) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.1164 0.0598 
 (-0.69) (0.86) 
EQUITY / ASSET 0.3759 -0.6101* 
 (0.36) (-1.71) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS -9.4758*** 5.9167*** 
 (-3.73) (5.67) 
COST / INCOME -0.4807*** 0.2392*** 
 (-2.72) (4.38) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.458 0.613 
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The table reports the results of the effect of different country-level institutional characteristics on the impact of board 
diversity reforms on bank stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk (STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY). The model in 
Panel A includes the interaction between the post-diversity reform (DREFORM) dummy and the economic freedom index 
dummy (DFREEDOM) which takes the value of 1 if a country’s economic freedom index is above the sample mean 
(higher economic freedom) and 0 otherwise (lower economic freedom). The model in Panel B includes the interaction 
between the post-diversity reform dummy (DREFORM) and the legal structure dummy (DLEGAL) which takes the value 
of 1 the legal system and protection of property rights index is above the sample mean (higher protection of persons and 
their rightfully acquired property) and 0 otherwise (lower national protection of persons and their rightfully acquired 
property). Variables are winsorised at the 99% level of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics calculated using 
standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 






Table 8 The effect of pre-reform bank board diversity status  
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
DREFORM 0.1842** 0.1556** 0.1654** 0.0825*** 0.0727*** 0.0871*** 
 (2.62) (2.18) (2.38) (2.73) (2.64) (3.16) 
DREFORM x DDIV_PRE -0.1416*   -0.0741**   
 (-1.81)   (-2.35)   
DREFORM x DWOM_PRE  -0.0244   -0.0308  
  (-0.34)   (-1.03)  
DREFORM x DEMPL_PRE   -0.0771   -0.1064*** 
   (-0.79)   (-4.08) 
SIZE -0.0130 -0.0105 -0.0117 0.0269*** 0.0247*** 0.0232*** 
 (-0.87) (-0.67) (-0.73) (3.79) (3.34) (3.21) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.1854 -0.1628 -0.1603 0.0328 0.0332 0.0364 
 (-1.50) (-1.36) (-1.34) (0.59) (0.64) (0.70) 
LOAN / ASSET -0.2233** -0.2155** -0.2235** -0.1133** -0.0819 -0.0926* 
 (-2.09) (-2.07) (-2.12) (-2.14) (-1.51) (-1.77) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.1331 -0.068 -0.0842 0.0369 0.0451 0.0225 
 (-0.82) (-0.42) (-0.52) (0.48) (0.60) (0.31) 
EQUITY / ASSET 1.2669 0.6898 0.5507 -0.9400** -0.9399** -1.1340*** 
 (0.98) (0.60) (0.45) (-2.43) (-2.53) (-3.40) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / 
LOANS 
-11.3635*** -10.6957*** -10.7991*** 6.6971*** 6.6771*** 6.5209*** 
 (-4.28) (-3.99) (-4.05) (5.66) (5.72) (5.87) 
COST / INCOME -0.5421*** -0.5219*** -0.5253*** 0.2714*** 0.2600*** 0.2550*** 
 (-2.94) (-2.90) (-2.93) (4.63) (4.41) (4.43) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 525 552 552 525 552 552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.451 0.458 0.459 0.611 0.601 0.611 
The table reports the results of the effect of the pre-reform level of board diversity on the impact of board diversity reforms 
on bank stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk (STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY). Model (1) includes the interaction 
between the post-diversity reform dummy(DREFORM) and the board diversity dummy (DDIV_PRE) which takes the value 
of 1 if the average value of a bank’s board diversity index over the two years prior to the reform is above the sample mean 
of 2007 (higher diversity) and 0 otherwise (lower diversity). Model (2) includes the interaction between the post-diversity 
reform dummy (DREFORM) and the pre-reform gender diversity dummy (DWOM_PRE) which takes the value of 1 if the 
average fraction of women on a bank’s board over the two years prior to the reform is above the sample mean of 2007 
(higher gender diversity) and 0 otherwise (lower gender diversity). Model (3) includes the interaction between the post-
diversity reform dummy (DREFORM) and the pre-reform employee representation dummy (DEMPL_PRE) which takes the 
value of 1 if the average fraction of employees on a bank’s board over the two years prior to the reform is above the sample 
mean of 2007 (higher employee representation) and 0 otherwise (lower employee representation). Variables are winsorised 
at the 99% level of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the 







Table 9 The impact of board diversity reforms on bank performance - Pseudo adoption years 
 Placebo test – Pre-reform Placebo test – Post-reform 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY 
STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.0426 0.036 0.0911 -0.0291 
 (0.19) (0.95) (1.17) (-1.13) 
SIZE -0.0113 0.0212** -0.0025 0.0135** 
 (-0.62) (2.58) (-0.13) (2.07) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.0515 -0.0234 -0.1832 0.0075 
 (-0.29) (-0.22) (-1.21) (0.15) 
LOAN / ASSET -0.3009** -0.0439 -0.1075 -0.0306 
 (-2.43) (-0.67) (-0.66) (-0.49) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.0971 0.0461 -0.1157 -0.0474 
 (-0.41) (0.50) (-0.38) (-0.46) 
EQUITY / ASSET 1.6163 -1.0273** -0.854 -0.5584 
 (1.15) (-2.46) (-0.47) (-1.18) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / 
LOANS 
-10.9719*** 4.8468** -11.7939*** 4.2434*** 
 (-4.32) (-2.43) (-3.86) (2.84) 
COST / INCOME -0.5193*** 0.2114*** -0.7007** 0.2595*** 
 (-3.51) (2.69) (-2.09) (2.75) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 321 321 368 368 
Adjusted R-squared 0.511 0.624 0.296 0.574 
The table reports the results of placebo tests using pseudo adoption years on bank stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk 
(STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY). The first placebo test restricts the analysis to the country pre-reform periods and sets the 
pseudo reform effective year as 4 years prior to the actual reform effective year. The second placebo test restricts the analyses 
to the country post-reform periods and sets the pseudo reform effective year as 3 years after the actual reform effective year. 
Variables are winsorised at the 99% level of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 




Table 10 Alternative dependent variable: Tobin’s Q  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
DREFORM 0.0276 0.0305 -0.1469 -0.0773 -0.1959 
 (0.32) (0.32) (-1.58) (-1.07) (-1.66) 
DREFORM x DQUOTA  -0.0108    
  (-0.11)    
DREFORM x DHOF   0.4219**   
   (2.36)   
DREFORM x DCOM    0.6712**  
    (2.17)  
DREFORM x DDIV_PRE     0.5307*** 
     (3.16) 
SIZE -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0103 0.0031 -0.0212 
 (-0.05) (-0.05) (0.24) (0.07) (-0.48) 
ASSET GROWTH 0.7601*** 0.7598*** 0.7604*** 0.7462*** 0.7805*** 
 (3.13) (3.13) (3.19) (3.21) (3.26) 
LOAN / ASSET 0.2042 0.2033 0.2371 0.1970 0.4731 
 (0.59) (0.60) (0.69) (0.58) (1.22) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET 0.1394 0.1413 0.2722 0.1558 0.2273 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.66) (0.40) (0.45) 
EQUITY / ASSET 2.3308 2.3167 2.0182 1.9901 2.8308 
 (0.84) (0.83) (0.73) (0.75) (0.74) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS 3.8741 3.9092 5.3116 5.7317 6.6695 
 (0.78) (0.77) (0.96) (1.25) (1.20) 
COST / INCOME 0.8549 0.8517 0.8465 0.8216 0.9692 
 (1.61) (1.61) (1.58) (1.57) (1.63) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 604 620 525 
Adjusted R-squared 0.538 0.537 0.548 0.546 0.539 
The table reports the results of the effects of board diversity reforms on bank performance proxied by a measure 
related to valuation (Tobin’s Q) and various interaction dummies that capture different country- or bank-level 
characteristics. Model (1) presents the baseline results for the effects of board diversity reforms. Model (2) presents 
the results adding DREFORM x DQUOTA, the interaction between the diversity reform dummy and the quota 
dummy which takes the value of 1 if the reforms are mandatory rather than affirmative actions. Model (3) presents 
the results adding DREFORM x DHOF, the interaction between the diversity reform dummy and the country-
specific Hofstede dummy which takes the value of 1 if the sum of the six Hofstede dimensions of national culture is 
above the sample mean (higher national openness to diversity) and 0 otherwise (lower national openness to 
diversity). Model (4) presents the results adding DREFORM x DCOM, the interaction between the diversity reform 
dummy and the common law dummy which takes the value of 1 for countries with a common law framework and 0 
for countries with a civil law framework. Model (5) presents the results adding DREFORM x DDIV_PRE, the 
interaction between the diversity reform dummy and the bank-specific pre-reform board diversity dummy 
(DDIV_PRE) which takes the value of 1 if the average value of a bank’s board diversity index over the two years 
prior to the reform is above the sample mean of 2007 (higher diversity) and 0 otherwise (lower diversity). Variables 
are winsorised at the 99% level of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 





Appendix 1 Reforms promoting diversity in board of directors of listed firms 
Country First board 
diversity reform 
Type of board diversity reform Sources 
  Year Gender Employees Other  
Austria 2009 Yes  Yes The Austrian Code of Corporate Governance is based on the provisions of the Austrian 
corporation law, securities law and capital markets law as well as on the principles set out in 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
Belgium 2009 Yes  Yes The Belgian Code of Corporate Governance is based on the existing Belgian legislation 
applicable to companies, in particular the provisions of the Belgian Code on Companies and 
financial law applicable to listed companies. 
Cyprus     The 2009 Corporate Governance Code issued by the Cyprus Stock Exchange Council is 
enriched by developments both in current Cypriot business practice as well as international 
practice. 
Czech Republic     The 2004 Corporate Governance Code is based on the OECD Principles and it is drawn up by 
the Securities Commission in cooperation with experts of the British Know How Fund. 
Denmark 2008 Yes Yes Yes The Recommendations on Corporate Governance comply with Danish and EU company law, 
OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance and recognised best practice. The 
recommendations are based on, and supplement, company law and stock exchange regulation, 
and such rules and regulations are presumed known. 
Finland     The 2008 Corporate Governance Code, issued by the Board of the Securities Market 
Association, takes into account changes in regulation and international development. 
France 2008 Yes Yes Yes The Recommendations on Corporate Governance, which constitutes the AFEP-MEDEF Code, 
is the reference code pursuant to the Act No. 2008-649 of 3 July 2008 containing various 
provisions adapting company law to Community law and amending Articles L. 225-37 and L. 
225-68 of the French Commercial Code. 
Germany 2009 Yes  Yes The German Corporate Governance Code contains internationally and nationally recognised 
standards for good and responsible governance. 
Greece 2011 Yes   The SEV Corporate Governance Code is based on Law 3873/2010, which incorporates into 
Greek legislation EU Directive 2006/46/EC4. 
Hungary     The 2008 Corporate Governance Recommendations are considered to be an addition to 
relevant Hungarian legislation (predominantly Act IV of 2006 on business associations) and 
are prepared by the Corporate Governance Committee of the Budapest Stock Exchange. 
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Ireland 2013   Yes The Corporate Governance Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance firms became effective. 
Italy 2011 Yes  Yes The Supervisory Provisions Concerning Bank Organisation and Corporate Governance is 
based on the Italian reform of company law and takes into account the most recent 
developments in the legislative framework for corporate organisation and governance, the 
transposition of the new prudential rules for banks, as well as the relevant principles and 
guidelines developed at national and international level. 
Lithuania 2010    The Corporate Governance Code gives specific consideration to similar codes, standards and 
principles adopted by other states and international organisations. 
Malta 2014 Yes   The Corporate Governance Manual for directors of investment companies and collective 
investment schemes became effective. 
Netherlands 2008 Yes  Yes The Dutch corporate governance code is part of a larger system, formed by Dutch and 
European legislation and case law on corporate governance. 
Poland 2010    The Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies draws upon the tradition of Polish 
corporate governance, developed by a range of individuals and institutions in the financial 
market with a significant expert and practical contribution by the Best Practices Committee 
and in the course of discussions with the Institute for Market Economy Research. 
Portugal 2012    The Portuguese Government adopted a Resolution of Council of Ministers to increase, in the 
public and private sectors, the participation of women in the management bodies of the 
companies which complements the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários Corporate 
Governance Code. 
Romania     The Corporate Governance Code of 2009 contains certain recommendations that are 
supplementary provisions to legal obligation under the laws of Romania (e.g. Companies Act, 
the Accounting Act, the Capital Market Act). 
Spain     The Corporate Governance Code, revised in 2013, is based on the Ley del Mercado de 
Valores, and on the relevant principles and practices at international level. 
Sweden     The Swedish Corporate Governance Code was updated in 2008 and it is based on the Swedish 
Companies Act which came into force on 1 January 2006. 
United Kingdom 2010 Yes   The new version of the UK Code on Corporate Governance became effective. 
Data are from the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), 





Appendix 2 Variable definitions  
 Definition Source 
Performance measures 
STOCK RETURN Annualised average daily stock return   Datastream (now Thomson Eikon) 
STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY 
Standard deviation of STOCK RETURN (t, t-1, t-2) Authors' calculation using Datastream data 
(now Thomson Eikon) 
TOBIN’S Q Tobin’s Q = (Total assets – Book value of equity + 
Market value of equity) / Total assets. In the 
estimation we use the natural logarithm. 
Author’s calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) and Datastream (now Thomson 
Eikon) data 
 
Reform variables   
DREFORM Post-diversity reform dummy equal to 1 when the first 
diversity reform is introduced and thereafter, and 0 
otherwise (*) 
Authors' calculation using: European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), the 
European Commission (EC), the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions (Eurofound), the 
European Trade Union Institute, the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the 
World Bank Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC), and 
publications from each country’s relevant 
regulator 
DREFORM[0; +2] Post-diversity reform window dummy equal to 1 for 
the year the first diversity reform is introduced (t=0) 
and two subsequent years (t=(+1, +2)), and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
   
DREFORM[+3; T] Post-diversity reform window dummy equal to 1 for 
year three after  the first diversity reform is introduced 
(t=3) and subsequent years, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
DREFORMt; Post-diversity reform timing dummy equal to 1 for the 
year the first diversity reform is introduced (t=0), one 
year after the reform (t=1), and two years after the 
reform (t=2), and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
DQUOTA Quota dummy equal to 1 if a mandatory reform is 




BOARDWOM Fraction of women on the board  Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDEMPL Fraction of employees on the board Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDNATMIX Fraction of foreign members on the board Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDAGE Average age of board members Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
CVBOARDAGE Coefficient of variation of board members' age = 
Standard deviation of board members’ age / 
BOARDAGE 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDDIVX Board diversity index = (1) The board diversity 
variables (BOARDWOM, BOARDEMPL, 
BOARDNATMIX, and CVBOARDAGE) are converted 
into discrete variables ranging from 1 to 10 based on 
the decile of the sample distribution they fall into (with 
1 being the bottom and 10 the top decile); (2) the 
diversity index for each bank-year is computed as 
BOARDDIVX = ∑ D . The index ranges from 0 
(low diversity) to 1 (high diversity). 
 Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
DDIV_PRE Pre-reform board diversity dummy equal to1 if the 
average value of the board diversity index over the two 
years prior to the reform is above the sample mean of 
2007 (higher board diversity), and 0 otherwise (lower 
board diversity)  
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
DWOM_PRE Pre-reform gender diversity dummy equal to 1 if the 
average fraction of women on the board over the two 
years before the reform is above the sample mean of 
2007 (higher board gender diversity), and 0 otherwise 
(lower board gender diversity) 
Authors' calculation 
DEMPL_PRE Pre-reform employee representation dummy equal to 1 
if the average fraction of employees on the board over Authors' calculation 
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the two years before the reform is above the sample 
mean of 2007 (higher board employee representation), 
and 0 otherwise (lower board employee representation) 
 
Bank-specific characteristics 
TOTAL ASSET Total assets (euro billions) Bankscope (now Orbis Bank) 
SIZE Ln(TOTAL ASSET) Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
ASSET GROWTH Total asset growth Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
LOAN / ASSET Loan ratio = Gross loans to total assets Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
DEPOSIT / ASSET Deposit ratio = Deposit and short-term funding to total 
assets 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
EQUITY / ASSET Equity to total assets Bankscope (now Orbis Bank) 
LOAN LOSS 
PROVISION / LOANS 
Quality of loan portfolio = Loan loss provisions to 
gross loans 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
COST / INCOME Cost to income ratio Bankscope (now Orbis Bank) 
 
Country-specific characteristics 
DHOF Hofstede dummy = (1) For each country in the sample 
the total value of the six Hofstede dimensions of 
national culture (i.e., (100 - power distance), 
individualism, (100 - masculinity), (100 - uncertainty 
avoidance), long-term orientation, and indulgence) is 
derived; (2) the Hofstede dummy is assigned the value 
of 1 if the derived value is above the sample mean 
(higher national openness to diversity), and 0 
otherwise (lower national openness to diversity) 
Authors' calculation using the Hofstede 
Insight data 
DCOM Common law dummy equal to 1 if a country has a 
common law legal system, and 0 if a country has a 
civil law legal system 
Authors' calculation using: CIA; 
Commonwealth network; NYU Law Global; 
Hatzimihail (2013)  
DFREEDOM Economic freedom dummy equal to 1 if the economic 
freedom index is above the sample mean (higher 
economic freedom), and 0 otherwise (lower economic 
freedom) 
Authors' calculation using: The Fraser 
Institute (2018) 
DLEGAL Legal structure dummy equal to 1 if the legal system 
and protection of property rights index is above the 
sample mean (higher protection of persons and their 
rightfully acquired property), and 0 otherwise (lower 
protection of persons and their rightfully acquired 
property) 
Authors' calculation using: The Fraser 
Institute (2018) 





















STOCK RETURN 1            
             
STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY 
-0.0457 1           
 0.2503            
TOBIN’S Q -0.0535 0.1606* 1          
 0.1781 0.0000           
SIZE 0.0130 0.2772* 0.0820* 1         
 0.7430 0.0000 0.0389          
ASSET GROWTH -0.0719* -0.1822* 0.1414* -0.2196* 1        
 0.0704 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000         
LOAN/ASSET -0.0670* -0.0234 0.0266 -0.2297* -0.0290 1       
 0.0911 0.5559 0.5029 0.0000 0.4631        
DEPOSIT/ASSET 0.0011 -0.1400* 0.0627 -0.6158* 0.0644 0.3610* 1      
 0.9781 0.0004 0.1143 0.0000 0.1034 0.0000       
EQUITY/ASSET 0.0645 -0.2692* -0.0250 -0.4732* 0.0495 0.2987* 0.4406* 1     
 0.1044 0.0000 0.5290 0.0000 0.2108 0.0000 0.0000      
LOAN LOSS 
PROVISION/LOANS 
-0.0129 0.3557* 0.2060* -0.0665* -0.1412* 0.2157* 0.2098* 0.1059* 1    
 0.7477 0.0000 0.0000 0.0947 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0077     
COST/INCOME -0.1893* 0.2842* 0.1133* 0.0615 -0.1113* -0.2427* -0.1729* -0.2660* 0.0371 1   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043 0.1197 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3527    
BOARDWOM 0.0912* -0.0900* -0.0462 0.2730* -0.0589 -0.1441* -0.2796* -0.2270* -0.1100* -0.0456 1  
 0.0300 0.0322 0.2728 0.0000 0.1619 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0095 0.2802   
BOARDEMPL 0.0804* -0.1950* -0.2531* 0.0742* -0.0826* -0.2193* -0.0208 -0.2078* -0.1928* 0.0783* 0.3055* 1 
 0.0559 0.0000 0.0000 0.0776 0.0494 0.0000 0.6222 0.0000 0.0000 0.0635 0.0000  





Appendix 4 Sample composition by country in 2014 
 
Country Number of banks Number of bank-year 
observations 
Austria 5 40 
Belgium 3 19 
Cyprus 3 22 
Czech Republic 1 8 
Denmark 5 40 
Finland 2 14 
France 8 64 
Germany 4 32 
Greece 3 21 
Hungary 1 8 
Ireland 2 16 
Italy 13 103 
Lithuania 1 8 
Malta 1 8 
Netherlands 1 8 
Poland 7 54 
Portugal 4 31 
Romania 1 8 
Spain 6 44 
Sweden 5 40 
United Kingdom 8 57 
Total 84 645 
The table shows the number of banks in the sample and the number of bank-year observations 





Appendix 5: Pre- and Post-reform board diversity characteristics by country 
 
Panel A: Affirmative actions  
BOARDDIVX BOARDWOMEN 









Austria 10 0.68 29 0.69 10 0.11 30 0.12 
Belgium 6 0.34 13 0.45 6 0.07 13 0.11 
Germany 8 0.64 24 0.65 8 0.13 24 0.17 
Denmark 3 0.54 17 0.58 3 0.16 29 0.18 
Greece 16 0.38 9 0.35 19 0.10 6 0.13 
Ireland 12 0.42 4 0.43     
Lithuania 0 
 
3 0.41     
Malta 1 0.30 1 0.10 2 0.06 1 0.00 
Netherlands 15 0.47 27 0.47     
Poland 20 0.36 10 0.41     
Portugal 18 0.39 34 0.52 18 0.10 35 0.18 
United 
Kingdom 
10 0.68 29 0.69 10 0.11 30 0.12 
Panel B: Mandatory reforms  
BOARDDIVX BOARDWOMEN 
  No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs. Mean 
Pre-mandatory reform Post-mandatory reform Pre-mandatory reform Post-mandatory reform 
         
France 10 0.54 33 0.51 20 0.17 25 0.21 
Italy 57 0.30 33 0.41 62 0.03 35 0.15 
The table reports summary statistics (number of observations and mean) for board diversity variables used in the 
analysis for countries where reforms were implemented during the sample period. Panel A reports the statistics by 
countries where affirmative actions aimed at encouraging diversity and gender diversity were approved. Panel B 
reports the statistics by countries where mandatory reforms introducing gender quotas were implemented. 
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